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FOREWORD
• The group of recovery measures passed by the special session 
of Congress in 1933 constitutes somewhat of a landmark in eco­
nomic history. Even more remarkable than the measures them­
selves is the change in economic philosophy that brought them 
about. The swing from America’s traditional economic philoso­
phy of individualism toward a greater degree of social control 
that brought these recovery measures into being is one of the 
most significant events of modern times.
The recovery measures could not have been put through if 
this change of emphasis from individualism toward more social 
control had not taken place; they cannot be enforced unless the 
change continues to receive general public sanction. Is this 
swing only temporary, only a result of the depression ? With 
returning prosperity, will the country return to individualism 
with the minimum of social control? Or is the change some­
what permanent; may it even presage further steps in the same 
direction? This question is the subject of the present bulletin.
2
Bulletin, Vol. 27 [1933], No. 313, Art. 1
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/bulletin/vol27/iss313/1
Prospects for Agricultural Recovery
IV . National Economic Planning
B y  Geoffrey Shepherd*
During 1933, a sudden and striking increase in governmental 
regulation of private business took place in the United States.
By the latter part of the year, the country’s industries had 
practically all been brought under federal codes, enforceable 
by governmental authority, which set minimum wages and 
maximum hours of work; blue eagles had appeared in shop 
and factory windows on every hand; farmers were planting 
cotton or wheat, not according to their own individual plans 
but according to their contracts with the federal government; 
the government was buying and slaughtering several million 
lightweight pigs in an endeavor to reduce the supply and in­
crease the price of hogs; it was developing a vast power and 
rehabilitation project at Muscle Shoals in the Tennessee Valley; 
it was stringently defining the conditions under which securi­
ties can be issued, and in a dozen other ways regulating private 
business. At least for the time being, the United States sub­
stantially modified her traditional economic policy of free com­
petition, individualism, and “ no government in business,”  and 
greatly extended the application of the policy of governmental 
regulation and control.
A certain amount of governmental regulation of industry, 
of course, is not a new thing in America. In some fields, it has 
existed for many years. Banks have for generations been sub­
ject to some measure of state and federal control. Our rail­
roads operate under Federal regulation of rates; railroad 
freight and passenger rates are set, not by open competition, 
but by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Electric light 
and power companies, municipal street car or subway systems 
and other public utilities have been more or less regulated by 
public authority for years.
* The author appreciates the helpful criticisms and suggestions offered by 
his colleagues in the Agricultural Economics , Section and. the , Agricultural 
Economics Extension Service of Iowa State College.
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But two great fields of America’s economic activity—manu­
facturing industry and agriculture—have hitherto been sub­
jected only to the minimum of governmental régulation or con­
trol. These two fields have in the main operated under the gen­
eral policy of free enterprise and free individual initiative, con­
trolled only by competition and the “ natural economic laws” 
of supply and demand working through rising and falling 
prices.
So it is somewhat startling to find government regulation ex­
tended, in one series of sweeping emergency measures, into 
these two fields, manufacturing industry and agriculture. It 
is a phenomenon that raises two questions in oùr minds. First, 
why did it happen ? And, second, is it likely to last ? .
THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF THE EXTENSION OF 
GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL
The first question, “ What caused the sudden extension of the 
policy of governmental control?”  can be answered comparative­
ly easily by referring to the course of events during the present 
depression.
When the industrial depression began, in the latter part of 
1929, it was thought at first to be only a healthy business read­
justment, or at the worst, a temporary business recession. Time 
passed ; and conditions, instead of improving, grew worse. By 
the end of the second year, people became alarmed. By the end 
of the third year, unemployment in industrial centers and low 
prices for agricultural products caused widespread privation 
and misery. Revolt began to flare up in mines and factories 
and on Corn Belt farms. The country seethed with unrest.
There was reason for the revolt and the unrest. The situa­
tion was not only desperate ; it was absurd. People were starv­
ing in the midst of plenty. Our whole economic system seemed 
to be falling to pieces. On the one hand were tremendous sur­
pluses of grain, cotton and other raw materials, jamming the 
warehouses for lack of a market; on the other hand were 13 
millions of unemployed, many of them walking the streets, 
shivering and starving for lack of these very goods. Here were 
idle factories, idle men, idle raw materials and idle money. 
Here were people desperately needing work, and desperately
4
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needing food, clothing and shelter; and they stood powerless, 
with surplus stocks of grain, cotton, leather and lumber on the 
one hand, and excess manufacturing capacity for making these 
raw materials into food, clothing and shelter on the other. The 
economic system was unable to bring the laborer, the raw ma­
terials and the factories together to produce the flow of goods 
so urgently needed.
In this situation, great popular pressure was brought to bear 
upon the government to do something to end the depression. The 
emergency measures passed by the special session of congress 
early in 1933 were the result. Underlying trends perhaps had 
prepared the way for this type of legislation; but the imme­
diate cause that put the legislation through was clearly the de­
pression.
GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL—EMERGEN CY 
EXPEDIENT, OR PERMANENT PLAN?
The second question is, how long is the program of increased 
governmental control likely to last? Are we merely in the mid­
dle of an emergency program that will be terminated when the 
emergency is over, or have we embarked upon a new and per­
manent policy of social regulation and control?
If the depression were the sole cause of the change in policy, 
we should expect that when the depression is over, the whole 
recovery program would be discarded. We should expect to 
see industry and agriculture return to free competition and 
individualism, with employers free to set such wages and hours 
as competition would permit, and with the farmers free to raise 
as much or as little produce as they felt inclined.
But if fundamental changes have been taking place below 
the surface in industry and agriculture, if underlying forces 
have been at work which render an increased amount of social 
control of industry and agriculture necessary as. a long-time 
program, then the new policy is likely to become permanent; 
it might even be expanded in the future.
Our first task, then, is to study what fundamental develop­
ments have been taking place in the organization and conduct 
of industry and agriculture, and to determine whether those 
developments call for an increase or for a decrease in govern­
mental regulation and control.
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Fig. 1. Relation of agricultural prices to industrial payrolls.
Our examination will be in the main restricted^ agriculture 
and manufacturing industry. Our primary concern is with 
agriculture, but our study cannot be restricted to agriculture 
alone. Agriculture’s income is so closely bound up with indus­
try ’s prosperity, and vice versa, that both groups have to be 
taken into account. This is shown in fig. 1, where the close 
parallelism of industrial payrolls and agricultural prices is evi­
dent. We shall also need to study the reaction of consumers as 
a group, since these reactions very directly affect both manu­
facturing industry and agriculture.
CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN ECONOMIC SOCIETY
A glance back into history will give us perspective for a 
study of the present-day organization of modern industry.
Back in 1776, when Adam Smith first- set forth the advan­
tages of free competition and unhampered individual enter­
prise, conditions were well suited to that policy. James Watt
6
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had not yet perfected his steam engine.1 Arkwright and Comp­
ton had not yet invented the spinning machinery that soon 
afterward pnt England in the lead in textile manufacture. 
Small-scale industry was the rule. The corporate form of busi­
ness was still in its infancy;2 Smith thought that corporations 
were not adapted to most lines of business, except banking.
Under the conditions of small-scale industry existing at that 
time, Smith showed that if each man were left to himself, in 
striving to further his own interests, he would unconsciously 
further the interests of society as a whole. He would be kept 
in line with the best interests of society by the action of com­
petition.
For example, a hat manufacturer who is trying to increase 
his profits may work out cheaper methods of producing hats. 
If he succeeds in producing hats more cheaply than his com­
petitors, his profits at first will greatly increase. But before 
long his competitors will copy his methods and produce hats as 
cheaply as he. Then, still under the urge of profit-seeking, 
they will all expand their production until the increased sup­
ply brings the price of hats down. Result: hats are cheaper; 
society is that much better off. People spend less for hats; 
and that enables them to buy gloves, let us say, which pre­
viously they could not afford. The standard of living thereby 
rises.
That was the situation in Smith’s day. But before a generation 
had passed, the industrial revolution had begun and the sim­
ple outlines of Smith’s picture were beginning to fade. Large- 
scale industry and the corporate form of business began to ap­
pear. Great inequalities in bargaining and competitive power 
resulted, hindering the working out of principles that were 
originally laid down for conditions of small-scale, independent 
industry.
1 W att invented a pumping engine in 1769, but he did not patent a revolv­
ing wheel engine (that is, a steam engine adapted to factory use) until 1781. 
Encyclopedia Brittanica, 14th edition. 21:353. 1929.
2 “In both Europe and America the development of the modern corpora­
tion appears to have received its impetus from the industrial revolution. 
• . . In England, incorporation continued to be a matter of special grant
by king or parliament until 1844, when associations with more than 25 mem­
bers were permitted to register as corporations. Limited liability was not 
accorded such corporations until 1855.” Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 
4:415-6. 1931.
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During the nineteenth century the corporation gradually as­
sumed a more and more dominant position. Toward the end of 
the century the public became alarmed at the size and power 
of the large corporations. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 
1890 was intended to protect society against the ruthless 
monopolistic practices that many of these large corporations 
employed.
But the corporation continued to grow in size and power. 
The fundamental reason for this was that the technical 
processes of production became steadily more and more round­
about, requiring larger and larger units for most efficient pro­
duction.3 And the advantages of large size applied not only 
to production but also to research,4 to purchasing and to sell­
ing units.5
At the present time, the corporation has become the typical 
form of business organization, and there is a great range in the 
size and power of these corporations. In 1929, there 
were about 300,000 corporations6 in the United States. The 
200 largest of these corporations were all capitalized at over 90 
million dollars each; several of them were capitalized at more 
than 1 billion dollars each. These 200 giant corporations were so 
large that although they constituted less than one-tenth of 1 per­
cent of the total number of corporations, they owned 49 percent 
(practically half) of the corporate wealth of the country, and 
did 43.2 percent of the corporate business.7
In this ‘ * giant corporation ’ ’ half of industry, furthermore, a 
startling thing has happened. The ownership of these corpora­
tions has been very largely divorced from the control of them. 
In the case of some of the larger companies, no one man owns 
any more than 1 percent of the outstanding capital stock.8 In
3 “Tested by the best available measures of actual operating efficiency, it 
appears that consolidations have in general achieved an appreciable superiori­
ty in production over the independent producers in their respective fields.” 
National Industrial Conference Board, “Mergers in Industry,” p. 171, 1929.
* Ibid, Ch. VI, “Industrial Research by Leading Consolidations.”
B “The concern which is large enough to undertake national advertising 
has a definite advantage over its smaller rivals.” Recent Economic Changes, 
1:217.
6 The figures in this paragraph refer to corporations exclusive of banking 
corporations.
7 Berle; A. A., and Means, G. C. The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, pp. 32, 35, 38. 1932.
8 Ibid. Appendices D and P, pp. 381, 382.
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the case of the majority of the companies, the stockholders are 
so widely scattered that they have practically no voice in the 
management or control of their property. The control lies al­
most entirely, not with the owners, as in the small businesses 
current in Adam Smith’s time, but with the management, the 
boards of directors. The men on these boards of directors 
thus become industrial autocrats. They are no longer subject 
to the will of the owners; they are very much a law unto them­
selves. And their power is increased by the fact that many 
of the men hold directorships in several different companies. 
These ‘ ‘ interlocking directorates”  concentrate control still 
further.
The structure of modern economic society is therefore great­
ly different from the system of small-scale individual industry 
that existed when the principles of individualism and free com­
petition were first laid down. There is great inequality in the 
size and power of the business units that constitute economic 
society today. These units range all the way from a few hun­
dred giant corporations at one end of the scale, to thousands 
of medium-sized corporations in the middle, and millions of 
small, individual producers, such as farmers, at the other end 
of the scale.
We speak of individualism, and of free and equal competition 
and bargaining power. But economic society today is not a so­
ciety of individuals, freely and equally competing and bargain­
ing. It is a society composed partly of individuals, partly of 
medium-sized corporations and partly of corporate giants.
INHERENT INSTABILITY
We have briefly surveyed the structure or organization of 
modern economic society. Let us now study how it works.
The doctrine of individualism takes the position that each 
man, if left to himself, in furthering his own interest best 
furthers those of society as a whole.
This proposition holds true insofar as individual productive 
efficiency is concerned, at least when full and free competition 
exists. But that field of action, productive efficiency, com­
prises only part of the individual’s economic activity. The 
1929 boom and the present depression have reminded us that
9
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in another broad field of action, the individual in striving to 
further his own interests does not thus further the interests of 
society as a whole. Indeed, in this other field, the individual is 
more likely to injure society than to benefit it.
The field of action referred to comprises the natural efforts 
of men to protect their own interests in time of prosperity or 
in time of depression. Consider first the manufacturer. When 
the pace of industry slackens, it is to the interest of the manu­
factured to discharge some of his men; but that cuts off those 
men’s purchasing power, and that reduction in purchasing 
power throws other men out of work; that reduces purchasing 
power still further, and leads to more unemployment and de­
pression.
The same thing is true of the consumer. When depression 
threatens, the individual consumer, acting in his own interest, 
begins to spend less money; he starts to save for the rainy 
day that is coming. This reduction in spending reduces the 
demand for goods. Production slackens accordingly, especially 
the production of capital goods; the employer, acting in his 
own interest, lays off some of his men. These men buy less 
than before, and production slackens still further; more men 
are laid off, and so on. Society is injured, not benefited, by 
these actions.
The case is also similar in the realm of banking. In time of 
depression, the prudent banker tries to get into as liquid a posi­
tion as possible. He calls as many loans as he can, and be­
comes very cautious in making new loans. This drains money 
from other banks, which are forced to reduce their loans also. 
This curtailing of credit injures production. And if depositors 
become alarmed about the condition of their banks, each de­
positor tries to protect his interests by drawing out his money. 
This may cause the whole banking system to collapse, as indeed 
it did in March, 1933.
The situation is equally unsatisfactory in time of prosperity, 
for then each man is led to expand, his expanding causing 
further expansion on the part of others, and so on up. And the 
resulting boom paves the way for another crash.
There is thus an inherent instability in a system constituted 
as ours is now. When times are good, people are optimistic, they
10
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spend freely, and times get still better; when conditions are 
bad, people are pessimistic, they spend less, and this makes con­
ditions worse. All of these actions are natural and wise from 
the point of view of each individual. But they are very harm­
ful from the point of view of society. In this sphere of ac­
tivity, what is good for the individual is distinctly bad for so­
ciety as a whole, and is therefore bad for the individual 
after all. v
TENDENCY FOR INSTABILITY TO INCREASE
In a simple economic society, such as that which existed 150 
years ago, scarcity of goods rather than inherent instability 
was the dominant feature. There was hardly enough food, 
clothing and other necessities to go round. Such instability as 
existed then resulted chiefly from occasional drouths and crop 
failures that made the general scarcity of goods more acute. 
There was little voluntary contraction of expenditures in those 
days. The standard of living of the great body of consumers 
was not far above the subsistence level ; it could not be con­
tracted very much no matter how black was the outlook. And 
in the field of production, the manufacturer’s investment in 
plant and equipment was only an insignificant fraction of what 
it is at the present time, so that contraction or expansion there 
was only a small factor.
Today, however, the situation is different. The average 
American’s standard of living is high. His income ordinarily is 
large enough that he can buy, not only the necessities of life— 
food, clothing and shelter—but also an increasing quantity of 
luxury goods such as an automobile, a radio, an electric re­
frigerator, artistic furniture, etc. Most of these luxuries are 
durable goods; they will last for a good many years.
Now the average consumer’s purchases of necessity goods 
cannot be contracted very much in time of need (even though 
these include many goods and services that were considered 
luxuries a few generations ago), but his purchases of durable 
luxury goods can be very greatly contracted. The old car can 
be made to run another year, or can be laid up entirely ; the 
purchase of tl\e electric refrigerator can be put off ; the old 
radio can be repaired, etc. The postponement of these pur-
11
Shepherd: Prospects for agricultural recovery, IV. National economic planni
Published by Iowa State University Digital Repository, 1933
76
chases of durable luxuries throws men in these industries out 
of work, and adds to the depression.
That is only one part of the story. Today, the processes of 
production are so roundabout, and the use of large plants and 
machinery is so extensive, that a large part of our industrial 
productive capacity is engaged in the production of capital 
goods—goods used in production rather than in consumption. 
Now it can be shown that a decline of 10 percent in the demand 
for consumer’s goods, such as clothes, may easily result directly 
in a decline of 50 or 75 percent in the demand for the machin­
ery needed to make these clothes.9 The capital-goods indus­
tries, such as the steel, iron and machinery industries, therefore 
feel the effects of depression very markedly.
EFFECT OF DIVERSE PRODUCTION POLICIES
The tendency for consumers of durable luxury goods and 
of capital goods to restrict consumption during depression is 
accentuated by the production policies of the producers of 
these goods. Most of these goods are produced by large cor­
porations, whose general policy is to hold the prices of their 
products as stable as possible. During depression, they at­
tempt to hold up the prices of their products by curtailing 
production.
This production policy is the reverse of agriculture’s. Dur­
ing depression, farmers continue to produce practically as 
much as before, allowing prices to fall to a point low enough 
to clear the market. This is shown graphically10 in fig. 2.
This is sound policy for the individual farmer. Operating as 
an individual, he is practically forced to adopt it. The amount 
he produces is such a small element in the total supply that if 
he cut down his individual production he would merely reduce 
his own gross income without exerting any appreciable effect 
on prices.
But the policy of industrial corporations is to reduce produc­
tion during depressions and hold prices up as much as possible. 
They followed this procedure during the present depression.
ness Seu  tS6 ®ta£!st%s ° L P^ UCtl01l  t*10 monthly Survey of Current Busi­ness. u . ». u. c .  These show that during the dépression the Droduetion nf
m a- T h ^ d S f f n  flesV2ryi : in„ some lines, production entirely ceased., J-ne aata m tigs. ¿, 3 and 4 come from the monthly Federal Resprvo hnl-
Statfstfcns the m° nthly “Wh0lesaIe Prices"  bulletins of t h f E u ^ u  of Labor
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Fig. 2. Agricultural production and prices.
The situation for two of the largest industries in America, the 
one producing durable consumption goods (automobiles) and 
the other producing capital goods (iron and steel) is shown 
in figs. 3 and 4. It is significant that production in both of 
these industries is dominated by billion-dollar corporations.
This policy of reducing production and maintaining prices, 
rather than maintaining production and reducing prices, is 
characteristic of manufacturing industry as a whole. Most 
other branches of industry are less successful in putting this 
policy into effect than the automobile and iron and steel indus­
tries just discussed, but they achieve a considerable measure 
of success. Industrial production as a whole was reduced, at 
the lowest point of this depression, to 53.7 percent of the 1926 
level ; the prices of finished manufactured products fell only to 
70.5 percent of the 1926 level.11 Contrast this with agricultural
11 The prices of “all commodities other than farm products and foods” fell 
to practically the sAme figure, 69.7. These indexes are all for July, 1932. 
They are given in the monthly bulletin, “Wholesale Prices,” issued by the Bu­
reau of Labor Statistics.
13
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Fig. 3. Production and prices in the automobile industry.
production, which stood at 94 percent of 1926, and agricultural 
prices, which stood at 47.9.
It is probably sound policy, from .the point of view of the 
individual manufacturer, to reduce production during depres­
sion. Large manufacturing corporations adopt this procedure 
either because the demand for their products fluctuates greatly, 
or because their large size and small number gives them a con­
trolling position in the market. The latter may be an impor­
tant element. There is some statistical evidence that the larger 
the corporation, in general, the more does it hold up the prices 
of its products during depression, and the more does it reduce 
production, curtail its purchases of raw materials and dis­
charge employees.12
12 Report of the Committee on Recent Economic Changes. Herbert Hoov­
er, chairman. “Recent Economic Changes,” pp. 204-6, tables 25-27. McGraw 
Hill. 1929. See also the 24th Annual Report of General Motors Corporation, 
Dec., 1932, p. 35, and the records of employment by industries in the Federal 
Reserve bulletins.
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Fig. 4. Production and prices in the steel industry.
These differing price and production policies, adopted funda­
mentally because of differing demands and unequal competi­
tive and bargaining power, may be the best for the individuals 
or corporations concerned, but they have unfortunate results 
for society as a whole, and therefore finally are bad for the 
individuals, too.
They render our economic system part rigid and part flexi­
ble, so that when booms and depressions occur, the prices and 
the quantities of different goods produced respond unequally. 
During depression, agricultural production continues at full 
capacity but at greatly reduced prices. On the other hand, 
industrial production is curtailed and prices are maintained 
as close to previous levels as possible. The whole system of 
balanced price and production relationships is strained and 
twisted out of shape. Economic dislocation, disruption and 
partial breakdown follows. After a period of recuperation,
15
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when prosperity returns, that sets up strains and stresses of 
an opposite nature to those caused by depression. Our eco­
nomic system is like a huge machine, part rigid and part flexi­
ble, that is continually being warped and twisted and thrown 
out of alignment so that it cannot work properly.
METHODS OF SOCIAL CONTROL
There is every indication that the characteristics of modern 
economic society outlined above almost inevitably become more 
and more marked in the future. Progress in research and in­
vention is likely to be as rapid—perhaps more rapid—in the 
future as in the past. Productive efficiency should continue to 
increase (as far as the limits of productive ability are con­
cerned), and the trend of the standard of living should con­
tinue to rise.
. The movement toward the concentration of industrial pro­
duction in fewer and larger corporate units that has been so 
marked in the past13 will apparently continue in the future; 
the tendency will be for the existing inequality of bargaining 
and competitive power to increase.
Because of these things, for the reasons given above, the ten­
dency will be for the inherent instability of economic society 
to increase. This tendency is likely to prevail, unless methods 
of social control are worked out to counteract it. It seems in­
evitable that the price of further progress will be further insta­
bility, unless we apply research and invention in the field of 
social control as well as in physical production.
Some social regulation has been necessary in the past. A 
further extension appears necessary for the future. • What form 
is this governmental or social regulation likely to take ? There 
are several different methods or courses of action that might 
be chosen.
ENFORCE COMPETITION
One course of action, which began 40 or 50 years ago, focused 
attention on the more powerful elements in society. It was ex-
13 The wealth of the 200 largest corporations at successive dates, that is, 
the 200 largest corporations then compared with the 200 largest corporations 
(not necessarily the same corporations) now from 1909 to 1928, increased at 
the rate of 5.4 percent annually; the wealth of the other corporations in­
creased only at the rate of 2 percent annually. The business done by the 200 
largest corporations increased from 33.5 percent of the total in 1920-23 to 
40.4 percent in 1926-29 and 43.2 percent in 1929.
The movement in the future may not be as rapid as in the past from 
1920-23 to 29, but is likely to be at least as rapid as from 1909 to 1928.
16
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emplified in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, in the trust- 
busting activities of Theodore Roosevelt, and in the Federal 
Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 
1914.14 Its object was to enforce competition, wherever it was 
lacking.
The proponents of this method believed that whenever the 
competitive struggle is rendered unequal by the large size of 
one of the combatants, the large combatant should be broken 
down into smaller freely competing units. It was in this spirit 
that the United States Supreme Court in 1911 ordered the 
Standard Oil Company to dissolve into several smaller com­
panies, more nearly equal to the size of the other companies in 
the field. Later on, the court changed its methods somewhat; 
under the “ rule of reason”  it adopted the policy of curbing, 
not size, but only the unfair competitive methods that were 
often associated with size.15
This method has two great shortcomings. In the first place, 
it ignores the fact that in many cases the large-size concerns 
are the most efficient producers, so that it is to the interest of 
society to preserve that large size rather than to reduce it.16
Second, the method attempts to enforce competition between 
individuals in the manufacturing group, but it does not even, 
touch the problem of the unequal economic power of individuals 
in different groups in their dealings with each other. It does 
not touch, for example, the problem of the inequality between 
the individual piece-worker in his or her dealing with the 
sweat-shop operator, or the individual farmer buying machin­
ery from a large implement manufacturer.
Accordingly, the method has been under fire (though not all 
of the attacks have been disinterested) ever since its inception.
14 Keezer, D. M., and May, S. The Public Control of Business. 1930.
15 Tippets and Livermore, Business Organization and Control, pp. 405-7,
1932. ,
18 A recent study shows that over a period of years, from 1900 to 1925, the 
prices of the goods produced by large “consolidations” or merged corporations 
have steadily and markedly fallen relative to the prices of other goods (N a­
tional Industrial Conference Board. Mergers in Industry. Ch. VIII. 1929). 
This indicates that large corporations are efficient producers, and that at 
least a part of the benefit of this efficiency is eventually passed on to the 
consumer.
That is, the long-run effects of the existence of large corporations is bene­
ficial to society. It is the short-run effects of their policy of holding up their 
prices and reducing their production during depression that is inimical to 
society.
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The emergency legislation of 1938 temporarily suspended some 
of the provisions of the Anti-Trust Act, replacing them, how­
ever, with safeguards of a different kind, described below.
CONTROL MONOPOLY
A second policy, which received a good deal of public atten­
tion from about 1910 onward, differs rather sharply from the 
first. ‘ I It proposed to allow business enterprises to consolidate 
freely in order to obtain all possible advantages of large-scale 
production, and to subject them to commission regulation as 
soon as their size and power were such as to destroy the occur­
rence of keenly effective competition in a given field.17 Instead 
of reducing the power of the strong by enforcing competition, 
it aimed to leave their strength unimpaired, but to harness it 
to the interests of society by public regulation. More recently, 
the method has also directed its attention to the weaker indi­
viduals ; it has sought to buttress the strength of the weak, as 
well as to control the power of the strong.
This policy, recognizes the difficulty of trying to reduce the 
power of the strong to that of the weak. It recognizes that in 
many fields large-scale production means low-cost production, 
and that the larger the unit the more efficient will be the pro­
duction of that stream of goods and services that constitutes 
the material basis of well-being. It, therefore, seeks to foster 
large-scale operation, instead of hindering it as the first method 
started out to do. Instead of breaking up the railroads, or pro­
hibiting combination in order to enforce competition, it orders 
the roads to consolidate, reduce competitive wastes and operate 
as much as possible as a unit, and submit to proper public con­
trol of rates. Instead of trying to break down the power of 
large financial interests, it sets up the Federal Reserve System 
in an attempt to control them and the monetary system as a 
whole. In a word, this second method turns from efforts to 
enforce free competition, to a systematic attempt to regulate 
and control monopoly.
It thus endeavors to increase the power of the strong, and 
to harness that strength for social purposes. In addition, it 
seeks to strengthen the power of the weak; it plans to aid those
17 Keezer, D. M., and May, S., The Public Control of -Business, p. 231. 
1930.
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who act as individual persons1—for example, the individual la­
borer, acting alone; the individual consumer, buying alone; the 
individual investor, buying securities of whose worth he knows 
little; the individual depositor in a bank; the individual farmer 
operating his farm; and so on.
Broadly speaking, this is the policy that is embodied in the 
1933 congressional legislation. This policy is being invoked, 
not only because of the depression, but also because of the un­
derlying changes described above that have been taking place 
in the structure and functioning of American economic society. 
The policy is the result of fundamental and persistent trends, 
and the evidence is that these trends will continue in the fu­
ture. The policy itself, therefore, is likely to be maintained, 
and perhaps further extended, in the future.
It seems likely that America will extend the social control of 
business within the framework of democracy and capitalism. 
That is, the federal government will probably lay down broad 
outlines or plans in the interest of society as a whole. Within 
the lines thus laid down, free enterprise and individual initia­
tive will be left to work, with such governmental regulation of 
the strong and assistance to the weak as appears advisable.
DOES MORE GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL MEAN LESS 
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY?
Many people have observed the steady trend in the direc­
tion of increased governmental control during the past few de­
cades, with increasing concern. It seems to them to mark a 
departure from the principles of individual liberty of action 
and freedom of enterprise which have been traditional in 
America.
Many people fear that if government control and regulation 
continues to increase, it will stifle individual initiative. To 
them, the aim of social control appears to be to glorify the 
state at the expense of the individual; and this runs directly 
counter to our ideal of giving the individual the fullest possible 
freedom from hampering state restrictions and regulations— 
our ideal of allowing only enough governmental interference 
(police protection, courts of justice, etc.) to insure the fullest 
possible freedom to the individual as such.
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NO ABANDONMENT OF IDEALS
This alarm concerning our traditional ideals seems hardly- 
justified. Free enterprise and free competition are not a sys­
tem of individual liberty, to be contrasted with systems of so­
cial control. Free enterprise and free competition comprise, 
after all, only one method of controlling individual effort in the 
interests of society as a whole, and conscious social control is 
only another method for accomplishing the same end.
Free individualism is only a method of social control of the 
individual in the interests of society by the action of free com­
petition. Where free competition exists, the individual thinks 
he is free; but in reality he is not free. In actuality, he is con­
tinually held in check by the competition of his fellows. The 
area in which he can exercise his freedom is often so cir­
cumscribed that his freedom is largely illusory. If he 
charges extortionate prices, competition draws his patrons 
away to his competitors and forces him to bring his prices 
down. If he pays low wages, his employees leave for other 
jobs, and he is compelled to raise his wages. Where competi­
tion really exists, it is a more ruthless taskmaster than any 
democratic government could attempt to be. Perhaps the 
clearest example of this is the condition of the farmer in 1932— 
completely “ free,”  yet ground down by 15-eent corn and $3 
hogs into a condition of economic slavery.
The trouble is that under our economic system today, with 
economic power so unequally distributed, neither competition 
nor bargaining power is free and equal. In some fields, free 
competition is too wasteful and destructive ; in other fields, it 
is reduced or restricted by the great size and small number of 
the producing units. Society recognized the inapplicability of 
the principles of free competition and individualism to some 
fields of industry—railroads, public utilities, banks, etc.— 
many years ago. It is now becoming clear that the character­
istics of modern economic society outlined above, and the 
trend toward further inequality of economic power, call for a 
further extension of public regulation into the field of indus­
try and of agriculture. This further, extension appears neces­
sary, not for the purpose of subjecting the individual to the 
state, but for the purpose of attaining the same ideals of indi­
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vidual liberty that the philosophy of free competition seeks 
but under modern conditions is not able to achieve.
ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES
An increasing extension of governmental regulation of busi­
ness appears inevitable, But the difficulties involved in this 
extension are truly staggering."
Consider first the international difficulties. Economic plan­
ning, so far, is a national affair. A managed currency, a man­
aged price level, regulation of production, wages and prices— 
these extend no farther than the national boundary. But the 
depression has reminded us that we are living in an interna­
tional world. Capital flows freely across national boundaries. 
Economic and psychological influences spread almost instan­
taneously from one country to another. An economic crisis in 
Germany, for instance, means lower hog prices in Iowa; Great 
Britain goes off the gold standard, and the price of wheat in 
Kansas declines. These international repercussions greatly in­
crease the difficulty of carrying national planning into effect.
Domestic administrative difficulties are fully as great. The 
United States is traditionally the land of rugged individualism, 
and our established philosophies and habits of thought are not 
easily changed. This is particularly true of agriculture. The 
farmer has always been the individualist par excellence. In 
the past, those who wanted freedom from social and industrial 
restraints commonly migrated to the agricultural frontier to 
get it ; and the tradition remains. It is also difficult to apply 
social regulation in agriculture because the producing units are 
small and the number of producers is great.
The pull and haul of sectional politics also hinder the proper 
execution of national economic programs. The more directly 
responsive such a program is to the needs of the people, the 
more susceptible it may become to the influence of “ pressure 
groups”  and sectional interests, unless an improved technique 
is worked out for reflecting the needs of the people as a whole.
Finally, a democracy can proceed on a national planning 
program only at rather a slow pace. It cannot put into effect 
measures which'are very far ahead of the average voter’s com­
prehension. Its program necessarily will deal with obvious
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and immediate problems, rather than with the more profound 
and fundamental root problems of economic society. The 
emergency measures passed during the special session of con­
gress in 1933 illustrate this point. Remarkable as they were, 
they could not far transcend the average citizen’s grasp and 
still receive support; accordingly they struck at the problem 
of maladjusted production among different industries (dealt 
with in figs. 2 to 4 in this bulletin) by the immediate and ob­
vious method of reducing supply in those industries such as 
agriculture where production had continued at full capacity. 
Perhaps this method was dictated also by the emergency na­
ture of the situation. But it seems clear that fundamentally, 
prosperity (that is, an abundance of material goods and ser­
vices) calls for increasing production in industries that have 
greatly reduced production, such as the iron and steel and 
automobile industries, rather than for reducing production in 
those industries that have been running “ full steam ahead.”  
But such a program, advisable as it might be, would be ex­
ceedingly difficult to work out and put into effect.
The problem of social control is much broader than any one 
group of emergency measures can solve. It is a problem that 
continually grows and continually changes. It will not be 
solved by the present emergency legislation as such, nor will 
it be solved by a return to free enterprise and individualism. 
The problem of rapid, safe and cheap transportation was not 
solved in a day, nor in a year, nor is it fully solved yet; nor 
would it be solved by a return to the horse and buggy. And 
the problem of social control is many times more difficult than 
the problem of transportation.
DIFFICULTIES WILL BE OVERCOME
But the problem of social control will be solved, partially at 
first and more and more completely with the passage of time. 
The pressure of economic forces will compel it. The question 
is not whether a great degree of social control is desirable. The 
fact is that it appears inevitable.
Society’s chief problem in the nineteenth century was the 
problem of increasing physical production; and to that end, 
all the resources of natural science and the experimental
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method were brought to bear. But during the present cen­
tury, another kind of problem has become increasingly impor­
tant. It lies in the field of social science. It is the problem of 
providing an economic framework of organization and control, 
within which the accomplishments of physical, chemical and en­
gineering science can find full range.
It is of small avail to increase productive efficiency 20 per­
cent if in the process our economic machinery becomes so dis­
organized that 25 or 30 percent of our working force is unem­
ployed, as it was early in 1933. The remedy is not to stop 
progress in productive efficiency; that must continue to in­
crease. ' The remedy is rather to match progress in production 
with progress in economic organization. The great impediment 
to the march of human progress today is not lack of produc­
tive power but lack of economic organization.
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